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BIRDS OF A FEATHER: ALLIANCES
AND INFLUENCES ON THE LAMER
COURT 1990-1997
By

PETER MCCORMICK*

The Supreme Court does not always speak with a single
voice; for many decisions, there are judges who register
disagreement with the majority's legal reasoning or
even with the outcome. Are there identifiable fault
lines dividing a persisting "majority" and "minority?"
Are there one or more "swing vote" judges who allow
thte minority some shareof the decisions of the Court?
And, given that the coalitions are shifting rather than
rigid, which pairings ofjudges most frequently (or most
seldom) hold together through these shifts? This paper
examines the divided panel decisions of the first seven
years of the Lamer Court to suggest answers to these
questions.

La Cour supreme ne s'exprime pas toujours Al'unisson;
dans plusieursddcisions, certains juges se dissocient de
l'opinion majoritaire, ou meme du resultat. Peut-on
discerner une fronti~re entre one majorit6 et une
minorit6 persistantes? Est-ce qu'il existe une tendance
chez certains juges minoritaires concdder certains
points de vue de la majorit6? Etant donn6 que les
coalitions sont tergiversantes plut6t que rigides, quels
sont les juges, qui tri-s frequemment (ou quelques fois)
maintiennent leurs lignes de conduite? Cet article
examine les decisions dissidentes des sept premieres
annees, rendues sous la direction du juge en chef
Lamer, afin de suggerer des reponses Aces questions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In strict legal formality, the nine justices on the Supreme Court
of Canada are absolutely equal, with the exception of the chief justice
who is, in that singularly opaque and unhelpful phrase, the "first among
equals." Each of them enjoys the full protection of judicial
independence, which means that they can "call it as they see it" without
fear of retaliation or repercussion. Each of them can listen to and take
part in the oral argument by which lawyers present to the Court their
positions in an appeal. Each of them takes part in the discussion at
conference that follows the oral argument and precedes the writing of
the reasons for judgment.1 Each of them casts an equal vote on whether
or not the appeal should succeed. And each of them can sign on to the
majority judgment, or write his or her own dissenting or separate
concurring decision, or sign on to someone else's dissent or concurrence.
It is the evolution of doctrine within these discursive reasons for
judgment constituting the precedent that binds the lower courts and
constrains the Supreme Court itself in its future deliberations.
But in fact this appearance of equality is, in any save the most
formal sense, largely an illusion. On any appellate court that sits in large
panels, there will, over time, be an identifiable group or groups that tend
to prevail when the court divides; and by the same token there will be
groups who tend to find themselves in the minority; and there may be
one or more judges positioned strategically in between, such that their
choices usually tip the balance. Court watchers and lawyers are fully
aware of this, if only in the informal sense of a gut feeling for the
particular judge or judges to whom the arguments might most usefully
be directed in any specific appeal. 2 Identifying these groups and these
balancers is therefore an important part of understanding the way that
any panel court operates over any period of time, and this is equally true
of the Supreme Court of Canada.
The crude outlines of these differences are easily observed.
When the Supreme Court delivers a non-unanimous decision, which it
1 For a description of the decision-making processes of the Supreme Court of Canada see, for
example, The Hon. B. Wilson, "Decision-Making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227.

2 See, for example, the piece entitled "Curiously cautious [U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day] O'Connor" The Economist (4 October 1997) 38-which suggests that "Justice O'Connor has
staked out the centre on many of the great questions before the Court," meaning that "in closely
contested cases, conservatives and liberals compete for her vote, since it is often the deciding one."
See also J.C. Jeffries Jr., Justice Lewis F. PowellJr.:A Biography, (New York: Scribner's, 1994) at xi,

introducing Powell as having been "the most powerful man in America" because of his "position at
the ideological center of a divided Court."
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does just over 40 per cent of the time, we can determine simply by
counting all the panel appearances that some judges (such as Cory and
Iacobucci JJ.) write for or sign on with the majority more than threequarters of the time, while others (such as L'Heureux-Dub6 and
McLachlin JJ.) do so less than half the time. Summed over hundreds of
panel appearances, these differences are significant, and it must mean
for lawyers arguing their cases before the Court that they usually have
greater .cause for optimism if Cory and Iacobucci JJ. are nodding their
heads than if McLachlin or L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. are looking pleased.
All judges are formally equal, but in terms of actively contributing to the
evolution of the Court's doctrine, some judges are "more equal" than
others. We can identify these judges by following the shifting patterns of
voting combinations and coalitions on the Court; and identifying them
brings us closer to understanding how the Court works in practice.!
This is not, of course, a question of merit; there is no implication
that the judges who write or join the majority decisions are necessarily
"better" judges than the judges who dissent or write separately. Indeed,
a string of appointments-more rarely, a single appointment 4-- can
abruptly reverse which judges are usually on the majority side and which
usually dissent. Rather, it is just to say that on controversial and
disputed matters of legal doctrine, there will over any period of time be
some individuals who are more successful than others at steering the
Court in their preferred directions. These are the judges who are
putting their mark on the law, who are contributing the most frequently
and the most effectively to the articulation of doctrine, whose influence
cuts the deepest and will probably endure the longest. What this article
attempts to do is to identify the judges who have enjoyed this greater
success-first by identifying the most frequently successful coalitions on
divided courts, and second by examining the justice-to-justice voting
linkages that have produced these coalitions.
I will be assuming throughout that the most important function
of the Supreme Court of Canada is to deliver reasoned judgments in the
process of resolving (allowing or dismissing) appeals from lower court
decisions. It is a critical feature of judicial decisionmaking, especially at

3 There are, of course, other differences and inequalities that are at least as important-for
example, if we know no more than the fact that both Lamer C.J. and Gonthier J. were on a panel
that delivered a non-unanimous decision, we would already know that Lamer C.J. is at least four
times as likely to be writing the majority decision. I will not be exploring the implications of these
further differences at this time.
4 See D.M. Levitan, "The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice" (1996) 28
U. Tol. L Rev. 37.
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the appellate level, that its results are usually accompanied by discursive
explanation-by written reasons for judgment that explain the logical
string of principles and definitions and doctrinal statements leading to
the immediate outcome! The reasoned opinion is "more than a device
for communicating the outcome of a case;" it is "a candid and rigorous
exercise in legal reasoning" that serves "important legal values" and "has
value independent of the result" in the case.
For everyone except the immediate parties (and sometimes even
for them) the outcome is less important than the reasons, because it is
the reasons that direct the deliberations of the lower courts and
constrain the future decisions of the deciding court. Timothy Terrell
suggests that we should think of any judicial decision as having not only a
notional locus on a multi-dimensional grid, but also a direction (in the
way that it builds on previous decisions) and a "spin" (in the way that it
invites certain extensions of its generalized principles and discourages,
or at least fails to invite, others). He is, of course, talking about the
reasons, not the outcome itself, which is much less communicative and
can be rather ambiguous.
But if the reasons are more important than the outcome, then we
should be less concerned about whether or not a judge has voted for the
particular outcome than whether or not that particular judge has joined
the majority in its reasons. I will therefore be assuming that a given
group of judges forms a decision-making coalition only to the extent that
they all sign on to a single set of outcome-plus-reasons. At first glance,
this may seem too restrictive. It is obvious that a judge who writes or
joins a dissenting opinion is not part of the successful coalition in that
particular case; but less obvious that the same is true of a judge who
writes or joins a separate concurring opinion. But this conclusion
follows if we are identifying the reasons for judgment as carrying greater
5 For a discussion of the significance of this requirement, see M. Shapiro, "The Giving
Reasons Requirement" (1992) U. Chi. Legal F. 179; and F. Schauer "Giving Reasons" (1995) 47
Stan. L. Rev. 633.
6 M. Wells, "French and American Judicial Opinions" (1994) 19 Yale J. Int'l L. 81 at 85.
7 T.P. Terrell, "Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the
Development of Fundamental Normative Principles" (1984) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 288.
8 For example, in Stewart v.Pettie, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 131, a hotel appealed a decision that
extended the concept of the "duty of care" in a novel direction and held the hotel liable for damages
caused by an inebriated patron. The hotel "won" its case, to the extent that the damages it was
required to pay were reduced. However, it is more important that the Supreme Court endorsed the
extended notion of the duty of care, disagreeing only on the importance of extenuating
circumstances in the immediate case. Focusing on the outcome-the hotel won its appeal-misses
the whole point.
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importance than the outcome itself-a separate concurrence by
definition accepts the outcome of the appeal (allowed or dismissed) but
explicitly distances itself from the reasons with which the majority or
plurality decision of the Court justifies that result. Some American
academics would push the argument a step further, suggesting that the
term "dissent" should be understood as including not just members of
the panel who disagree with the outcome but also members who
disagree with the reasoning I am not going quite this far; I will instead
adopt the somewhat milder wording of the Harvard Law Review's
annual survey of the United States Supreme Court, which simply refuses
to "treat two Justices as having agreed if they did not join the same
opinion, even if they agreed in the result of the case and wrote separate
opinions revealing very little philosophical disagreement."1'
In coding terms, a case such as Kenora (Town) Hydro Electric
Commission v. Vacationland Dairy Co-operative Ltd. 1 is straightforward-there is a set of reasons for judgment delivered by Major J.
and signed by four other judges, and there is a single dissenting opinion
written by Iacobucci J. and signed by three other judges. This is a
divided panel with a successful five-member coalition. But for my
purposes, a case like R. v. Rockey 2 isexactly the same-there is a set of
reasons for judgment written by Sopinka J. and signed by four other
judges, and there is a single separate concurring opinion written by
McLachlin J. and signed by three other judges. This is also coded as a
divided panel with a five-member successful coalition. There are also
cases such as Miron v. Trudel' 3 -in which McLachlin J. wrote a set of
reasons for judgment signed by three other judges, Gonthier J. wrote a
dissenting opinion likewise signed by three other judges, and L'HeureuxDub6 J. tipped the balance by writing a separate concurring opinion
supporting McLachlin J.'s outcome but differing from her reasons. In a
sense, of course, this is a five-to-four Court for the actual outcome, but
for my purposes this is a divided Court with a four-member successful
coalition writing a plurality decision, leaving not only the dissenting
Gonthier J. & Co., but also the separately concurring L'Heureux-Dub6
J., outside.

9 See K.M. Stack, "The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court" (1996) 105 Yale L.J. 2235.
See also A. Scalia, "The Dissenting Opinion," (1994) J. Supreme Court Hist. 33.
10 "The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases" (1996) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 135 at 369.
11 [1994] 1 S.C.R. 80.
12 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 829.
13 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.
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II. TIME FRAME AND DATABASE
This discussion is built on a database that includes all the
reported 4 panel 5 decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada during a
seven year period bounded on the one side by Mr. Justice Lamer's
ascension to the chief justiceship, and on the other, by the retirement of
Mr. Justice La Forest during the summer of 1997, shortly followed by the
death of Mr. Justice Sopinka in November of the same year. It seems
reasonable to take Lamer C.J.'s appointment as the beginning of a
distinctive period in the life of the Court-not only because of the
convention by which the Court is identified with the incumbent of the
centre chair, but also because a string of recent appointments left him as

a very senior member of a very junior court. By the same token, it seems
reasonable to take the departure of La Forest J. (who was second in
seniority only to the chief justice), and the death of Mr. Justice Sopinka
(who was then the third senior member of the Court) as marking the end
of an important chapter in the life of the Lamer Court, and possibly even
the trigger for a significant realignment.
The choice of this time period also recommends itself for the
stability of Supreme Court membership during the seven years. This
contrasts strikingly with the Laskin and Dickson Courts, which averaged
almost an appointment a year-a turnover rate without parallel in the
history of the institution. For a time it seemed that rapid turnover and a
"revolving door" Court were the hallmarks of the "modern" (postLaskin, post-Charter)Supreme Court, but the stability of the 1990's has
put the lie to this over-hasty generalization. Only the appointment of
Iacobucci J. in early 1991, and Stevenson J.'s replacement with Major J.
in 1992, spoil the researcher's dream of a stable complement of nine
judges sitting and interacting for the full seven years. In the American
literature this is referred to as a "natural court."
There is normally a time lag of several months between the oral
hearing and the handing down of the decision, and it is the date of the
oral hearing that will be used here: the database includes all those
reported decisions in which the oral arguments were heard after the

14 At one time, not all Supreme Court of Canada decisions were reported in the S.C.R.; some,
but not all, of the omissions are reported in the Dominion Law Reports (D.L.R.). Since 1970,
however, the coverage in the S.C.R. has been all but total.
15 The handful of single-judge responses to motions (such as Richter & PartnersInc. v. Ernst &

Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 5; and Esmail v. Petro-Canada,[1997] 2 S.C.R. 3) that appear from time to
time in the pages of the S.C.R. have been omitted.
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beginning of the 1990-91 term and before the end of the 1996-97 term.16
It seems anomalous that judges are sometimes reported as delivering
decisions or issuing dissents on a date after they actually left the Court
or died, but this is simply an artefact of the way that the hearing/
deliberation/delivery process works for Supreme Court decisions.
There were 770 reported panel decisions of the Supreme Court
for which the oral arguments were heard during the period indicated. In
each of these, each judge on the panel was coded as delivering or joining
the unanimous decision of the Court, or the majority decision of the
Court, or the plurality decision of the Court, or a separate concurring
decision, or a dissent. This coding is, by and large, straightforwardmuch more so than for the United States Supreme Court, whose
opinions sometimes exhibit a byzantine complexity bordering on selfcaricature, to such an extent that it sometimes becomes a "Herculean
task" to try to determine "whether an actual majority exists behind any
proposition."' 7 Even on the Supreme Court of Canada, it is sometimes
difficult in plurality decisions to determine which of the fragments can
best be taken as the closest approximation of the decision of the Court. 8
Sometimes the majority that forms behind part of the Court's reasons
differs from that supporting another part. 9 Sometimes a judge will
deliver a brief decision dismissing an appeal while recording her own
dissent from it.20 And sometimes a decision or a concurrence or a
dissent will be jointly authored by two judges, rather than written by one
judge and signed on to by one or more other judges.2 ' In these
situations, which all together were not sufficiently frequent to
compromise the database, the coding problems were resolved on the

16 More precisely, the statistics were collected and the analyses run on 1 November 1997.
There may well be some other decisions "in the pipe-line" at the moment of writing-I note that in
1996, decisions in three of the cases argued in June of that year were handed down in early
November-but they will be too few in number to affect these calculations.
17 See S. Gerber & K. Park, "The Quixotic Search for Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court"
(1997) 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 391.
18 As a "pure" example of this problem, albeit not one within the time frame being
considered, the "majority" in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 fragmented into three sets of
reasons for judgment; I take it that Dickson C.J.'s reasons are best treated as the plurality decision,
and Beetz J.'s as a concurrence. More recently, RJR-MacDonaldInc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199, posed a comparable problem.
19 See, for example, R. v. G.(S.G.), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 716.
20 See, for example, R. v. Osvath, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 7.
21 See, for example, R. v. CurraghInc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 537, which features both a co-authored
decision by La Forest and Cory JJ., and a co-authored dissent by McLachlin and Major JJ.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 36 No. 2

basis of common sense supportable by a closer reading of the specific
text.
For present purposes, this database will be further narrowed.
The analysis will deal only with what I am calling "divided panels"which means that I am excluding not only unanimous (and per curiam)
decisions but also those in which a large panel splits eight-to-one, or
seven-to-two, or six-to-one2 The total number of such decisions by
divided panels was 240 over the seven years.
As a result, the figures that follow understate the extent to which
the judges on the Supreme Court agree with each other-simply by
virtue of the fact that they omit the 57 per cent of all decisions in which
the panel is unanimous. However, the flip side of understating the
absolute levels of agreement is a closer focus on the relative levels of
agreement and disagreement-and this is what is important if we wish to
understand the way that the judges line up when they do not all line up
together, the way they group themselves when the Court divides. The
contracted database also has the advantage of omitting the dozens of
extremely brief formulaic decisions, in which a unanimous panel, and
often not a minimum panel of five, deals with an appeal in a brusque and
uninformative single paragraph. As a result, this analysis is built on
those cases in which the Supreme Court found an issue important
enough to divide it into two or more fragments, and identifying these
fragments is the central thrust of what follows.
III. JUDICIAL COMBINATIONS
A. Successful Coalitions
To begin with the obvious: the purpose of an appellate court is to
deliver reasoned judgments on appeals from the decisions of lower
courts. When the decision is not unanimous, of course, the number of
votes within the panel on either side of the issue decides whether the
appeal succeeds or fails. Usually this group signs on to a single set of
reasons-or, if they split, they do so in such a way that there is still a
majority of the panel supporting the reasons. When the fragmentation is
more severe, such that there is not a single set of reasons with the direct
support of a majority of the panel, the result is a plurality judgment,
which resolves the immediate case and constitutes precedent although in
22 This number also omits the eleven cases for which the Court was so fragmented that there
was not a group of three or more justices signing on to the reasons for judgment.
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a way that leaves some commentators feeling very uncomfortable?' The
Lamer Court delivered sixty-two such decisions' in seven years; in each
of these cases, the decision-delivering coalition was taken to be the
largest group signing on to a single set of reasons within the larger group
supporting the outcome, unless a closer reading of the text strongly
supported an alternative coding.'
The most important coalitions are those which include five
judges-being the smallest number that must always prevail, even on a
nine-judge panel; and, therefore, the smallest group capable of
establishing a line of precedent in a particular area of the law that
cannot easily be eroded.26 There will, over any period of time, be more
than one such coalition because there is no reason to think that there is
only one dimension along which to rank the judges. Different issues will
suggest different continua-not just coalitions of different sizes, but
coalitions including allies on one issue who were opponents on another
and vice versa. However, not all theoretically possible combinations will
be actual combinations, and it is the coalitions that make the transition
from theoretical possibility to concrete reality, that I am looking at,
especially those which do so the most often.
Over the seven years, sixty-eight cases were decided by five-judge
coalitions (including in this list five-to-two decisions as well as the
minimum five-to-four). At first glance this number seems rather small;
it works out to just under ten five-judge majorities per year, where the
comparable figure for the United States Supreme Court is between
sixteen and twenty." One obvious explanation is the fact that the United
States Supreme Court uses nine-judge panels almost exclusively, while
the Supreme Court of Canada uses a more flexible mix of nine-, seven-,
23 See, for example, J.F. Davis & W.L. Reynolds "Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the

Supreme Court" [1974] Duke L.J. 59.
24

This number excludes the eleven cases mentioned in supra note 22.

25 See, for example, R. v. Park, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 836, which consists of a lengthy set of reasons
for judgment signed by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. alone. Lamer C.J. and four other members of the panel
signed a very short (two paragraphs) concurrence agreeing with the outcome and much of the
reasons given, but expressly dissociating themselves from a lengthy section in L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s
analysis dealing with the interaction of consent and mistake of fact in a sexual assault situation. It
seems to me that the only realistic way to code this is with L'Heureux-Dub6 J. delivering a
one-person plurality judgment, with Lamer C.J. & Co. constituting a five-judge concurring group.
26 See, for example, P.H. Edelman & J. Chen, "The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme

Court at the Bar of Mathematics" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 63 [hereinafter "The Most Dangerous
Justice"]; and P.H. Edelman & J. Chen, "'Duel' Diligence: Second Thoughts About the Supremes
as the Sultans of Swing" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L Rev. 219 [hereinafter "'Duel' Diligence"].
27 "The Most Dangerous Justice," supra note 26 at 70-71.
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and five-judge panels. By definition, a five-judge panel cannot yield a
divided decision with a five-judge winning coalition, and many divided
seven-judge panels will also fall short of the five-member coalition
threshold when they split four-to-three. Another explanation may be
that the Supreme Court of Canada simply divides less often, partly
because its case-screening process' lets through a significant number of
cases that can be briefly disposed of, presumably because they are
routine or because they do not raise major questions of law.
There were thirty-five different successful five-judge coalitions
that formed at least once over the seven years. But a combination that
occurs only once in seven years is not much of a coalition, so I will limit
my concern to those combinations that occurred at least three times in
seven years-that is to say, roughly once every other year. There were
six such combinations, listed in Table 1. What stands out from this
listing is the pre-eminence of the grouping of Lamer C.J., Sopinka, Cory,
Iacobucci and Major JJ. When the court divides, no five-judge grouping
prevails even half so often as this particular combination; and on a
further ten occasions a five-judge divided-court majority was formed by
four of these judges plus a single outsider (Gonthier J. on seven
occasions, McLachlin J. on three).29 These numbers are not enormous,
given that sixty-eight decisions of divided courts were rendered by fivejudge coalitions, but it is significant that no alternative coalition was
remotely as successful. Thirty decisions of divided courts were decided
by six-judge coalitions, and although these were decided by fifteen
different combinations of judges, only three occurred as often as three
times over the seven-year span and these are listed in Table 1. Again, it
is striking that all three of these combinations include the five-judge
coalition identified above, which reinforces the impression that this
group constitutes the solid core of the Lamer Court.
If the Court always sat in nine-judge panels, then there would be
nothing more to say-only a point of view that could consistently recruit
at least five judges could prevail in the long run. Although groupings
smaller than five can occasionally prevail should the other Justices divide
between two mutually exclusive alternatives, such plurality outcomes
tend to be rare; Lynn Baker could find only two such decisions by the
28 Some cases still remain, such as appeals from decisions on indictable criminal offenses
involving a dissent on a matter of law in the provincial court of appeal, which must be heard as a
matter of right by the Supreme Court of Canada, regardless of whether or not the judges think the
case raises a question of national importance. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 691, 693.

29 Numbers given in the text may vary from totals on the tables, since the tables only reflect
coalitions that occurred more than twice.
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United States Supreme Court in the 1995-96 term.30 Plurality decisions
will also be provocative because a minority is setting the tone of the
Court on important issues, and vulnerable because the minority's
precedents can be overruled as soon as the majority coalesces against
them. In a Supreme Court that sits almost exclusively with full ninejudge panels, five is the magic number; and by the same token, these
panels display the power of the coalition members in the starkest form.
Making the point by hyperbole, Paul Edelman and Jim Chen suggest
that "the only time that an individual Justice's vote matters is when he is
in a coalition of exactly five Justices" because it is only in these instances
that "the
defection of any one Justice would make losers of the other
3'
four."
On the Supreme Court of Canada, full nine-judge panels were
used for only 31 per cent of reported panel decisions over the seven-year
period, more frequent than five-judge panels (27 per cent) but fewer
than seven-judge panels (42 per cent). The Court attempts a logical
triage, treating panels of seven as the norm with larger panels for the
most critical cases and five-judge panels for civil law appeals or cases
that are expected to be of lesser importance. However, this triage is
necessarily imperfect, and small panels can hand down important and
frequently cited decisions3 2 while some nine-judge panels issue curt oneparagraph formulaic decisions dismissing appeals "for the reasons given
in the court below." This makes it necessary to broaden the search for
successful coalitions. When seven-judge panels are common, four-judge
coalitions can enjoy their share of enduring successes; and when fivejudge panels hear one-quarter of all the cases, three-judge coalitions can
also form for effective results.
There were eighty-two cases in which four-judge coalitions
delivered the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada-about twelve
per year, compared with the single example Baker found for the United
States Supreme Court in 1995-960 3 This included forty-seven different
combinations of judges,3 4 only six of which occurred as often as three
times over the seven-year period, and these are also listed in Table 1. It
30 L.A. Baker, "Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the Search
for the Swing Justice" (1996) 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 187.
31 "The Most Dangerous Justice," supra note 26 at 66.
32 See, for example, Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Directorof Investigations and
Research, Restrictive Trade PracticesCommission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425.
33 Baker, supra note 30 at 217.
34 The few groups which included Wilson J. or Stevenson J.have been omitted, on the
grounds that these two served for too short a period for their participation to be comparable.
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is striking that the most frequently successful of the four-judge coalitions
includes precisely those four members of the Court who are excluded by
the five-judge "core." Sixty times-nine times a year, again compared to
a single United States Supreme Court example in the 1995-96 term' the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was delivered by a threejudge combination, only six of the combinations occurring more than
three times over the seven years. By far the most frequent of the threejudge combinations-indeed, the second most common coalition of any
number of judges to deliver decisions for a divided court-is also drawn
from the four judges outside the most frequently successful five-judge
group.
All of these successful coalitions are pulled together in Table 1,
and they seem to support several general conclusions. The first is that
the most successful five-judge coalition is clearly the Lamer-SopinkaCory-lacobucci-Major group, which I will call the "core;" no other
coalition of whatever size has delivered as many divided court decisions.
The members of this group also accounted for four-judge combinations
delivering twelve decisions and three-judge combinations delivering a
further ten. As well, the only three six-judge combinations to have
occurred as often as three times are comprised of this five-judge group
plus a single additional judge, further reinforcing the impression of
enduring agreement on divisive issues. In all, the core group in its
various combinations and recombinations explains a total of forty-seven
of the 240 divided court decisions, more than any other comparable
group. Chief Justice Lamer is clearly the leading spokesperson, having
delivered seventeen-and-one-half of their decisions.A
The second identifiable group is the one formed by La Forest,
L'Heureux-Dub6, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ., whom I will label "the
outsiders." This group accounts for a total of eighteen decisiondelivering combinations of divided courts-five as a four-judge group
and thirteen others as "contained" three-judge groups. This is quite a
surprising total considering that an alternative credible four-judge group
-say, Lamer C.J., Sopinka, Iacobucci, Major JJ.-accounts for only
seven, and this larger number reinforces the outsider's appearance as a
coherent group. Their leading spokesperson is La Forest J., writing tenand-one-half of their eighteen decisions.37
35 Baker, supra note 30 at 217.

36 The half-decision refers to the jointly authored majority decision by Lamer C.J. and
Sopinka J. in A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536.
37 The half-decision refers to the one co-authored by La Forest and McLachlin JJ. in BG
Checo InternationalLtd. v. British ColumbiaHydro and PowerAuthority, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12.
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TABLE 1
Decision-Delivering Coalitions

Size of
Coalition

Successful Coalition

Frequency

6-judge

Cory, Iac., Lamer, Major, Sopinka, McL.
Cory, Iac., Lamer, Major, Sopinka, Gont.
Cory, lac., Lamer, Major, Sopinka, La F.

5 times
5 times
3 times

5-judge

Cory, lac., Lamer, Sopinka, Major
Cory, lac., Gont., La F., L.'-Dub6
Cory, Gont., La F., McL, L.'-Dub6
Cory, Iac., Gont., Sopinka, L.'-Dub6
Cory, lac., Lamer, Sopinka, McL.
Cory, Iac., Gont., Sopinka, Major

12 times
5 times
4 times
4 times
3 times
3 times

4-judge

La F., L.'-Dub6, Gont., McL.
La F., L'.-Dub6, Cory, lac.
La F., Sopinka, Iac., Major
Cory, Sopinka, Lamer, Iac.
Cory, Sopinka, Lamer, Major
Cory, Sopinka, Iac., Major

5
3
3
3
3
3

times
times
times
times
times
times

9 times
L.'-Dub6, La F., Gont.
4 times
L.'-Dub , Cory, McL.
4 times
Lamer, Cory, Gont.
Lamer, Sopinka, Major
3 times
3 times
La F., Gont., McL.
L.'-Dub6, Cory, lac.
3 times
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.
3-judge

Minimum of three decisions.
Even more remarkably, the defection of Cory J. from "the core"
to "the outsiders" creates a five-judge group that is almost as successful
as the "core" itself. The "outsiders" alone account for eighteen
decisions but the "outsiders" plus Cory J. account for a total of thirtynine-almost as many as the core itself. No other defection carries even
a quarter of the punch. Cory J.'s pivotal position in the Court is strongly
hinted at by the fact that he is the only judge to appear in all six of the six
most successful five-judge combinations. However, even if Cory J.'s
adhesion so dramatically increases their success rate as to turn "the
outsiders" into "the alternative core," La Forest J. still remains the
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intellectual leader of this broader grouping as well, writing nineteen of
their thirty-nine decisions.
The problem is, however, that this methodology essentially takes
us in the direction of finding a single situationally powerful judge (Cory
J.) who appears constantly able to play the two wings of the Court off
against each other. The flip-side of this characterization is that we risk
turning the rest of the Court into little more than background against
which he operates-the back-up group, if you will, to his virtuosic solo.
But in fact the situation is nowhere near this static and polarized, and
the role of the other eight is nowhere near so passive. The concepts of
"core" and "outsiders" and "outsiders plus Cory J." all put together only
explain about one-third of all the divided panel decisions of the Court,
leaving the other two-thirds to be explained by shifting coalition patterns
across this major cleavage. At best, the "core," the "outsiders," and the
swing position of Cory J. together constitute the single most important
dynamic within the Court-and I do think this is the best way to think
about it-but it cannot be the entire story.
Edelman and Chen (whose articles were the starting point for
this analysis) attempt to use the list of successful coalitions to penetrate
the "deep structure" of coalitions and alliances on the United States
Supreme Court.' They do this by simply counting the number of times
that any specific judge appears on one of the listed coalitions-in the
case of the Lamer Court, six times for McLachlin J., twelve times for
Sopinka J., sixteen for Cory J., and so on-and turning it into an index
by comparing it with the notional "average member" of the Court. A
high score indicates a high level of demonstrated ability and willingness
to form alternative coalitions with other judges, which in turn suggests a
judge who is able to exercise the greatest leverage within the successful
coalition-the judge who must write, or the judge the writer cannot
afford to annoy, by virtue of being demonstrably the most likely member
of the coalition to defect. This approach makes Cory J. the end point of
a continuum rather than "one of a kind," but it seems to me that it still
has the tendency to make this "powerful voting" an attribute of the
individual judge rather than the product of multi-judge interactions.
What I want to do is to unfold the list of successful coalitions in a
different way, a way that keeps Cory J. in the context of the rest of the
Court. More specifically, I want to characterize all the members of the
Court (not just Cory J.) in terms of the varying degree of flexibility they
demonstrate in taking part (or refusing to take part, or being unable to
take part) in a range of voting coalitions. This tendency toward cohesive
38 "The Most Dangerous Justice," supranote 26; and "'Duel' Diligence," supra note 26.
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and persistent groupings is only clumsily approximated in the form of the
"core" and "outsiders" groups identified earlier; there is a great deal
more information to be teased out of the list.
The key, I think, is to treat each successful coalition as a string
of pairs of judges, organized around a specific view of the central issues
and their optimal resolution. For example: the trio of La Forest,
L'Heureux-Dub6 and Gonthier JJ. is the most frequently successful of
the three-judge coalitions. But we can also treat this as three different
pairs of judges (La Forest and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ., La Forest and
Gonthier JJ., and L'Heureux-Dub6 and Gonthier JJ.) each of whom has
mutually agreed with the other to sign on to a single set of outcome-plusreasons in a particular appeal 9 What this approach emphasizes is the
fact that if Gonthier J. (or whoever) enjoys "power" as a result of the
interaction, he does so because L'Heureux-Dub6 and La Forest JJ. have
chosen to "give" it to him. The price of this "power" is that he must give
comparable "power" back, and he can only keep this "power" so long as
they wish him to hold it. Gonthier J., on his own, is still just one judge,
one vote on the panel.
We can similarly reduce every successful coalition to a string of
such agreeing pairs, and sum them for each of the thirty-six possible
pairings on the Court. The results are shown in Table 2. This also has
the effect of weighting the larger coalitions more heavily-each judge on
a three-judge panel is part of two pairs, but each judge on a five-judge
panel is part of four pairs. This is justified because five-judge coalitions
are so critically important, being the smallest coalition of judges that can
prevail on a stable basis against all comers, whereas three-judge
coalitions depend on such fortuitous circumstances as their all being
assigned to the same five-judge panel, or a fragmentation of a larger
panel permitting a narrow plurality judgment.

39 For the present purposes, I will leave to one side the question of which judge is actually
writing the set of reasons to which the rest are signing.
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TABLE 2

Two Judge Pairings Within Successful Coalitions
(Unweighted for Coalition Frequency)
MAJ

LAM

SOP

JAC

COR

GON

LAF

McL

L'-D

MAJ

-

6

9

9

7

2

2

1

0

LAM

6

-

8

6

8

2

1

2

0

SOP

9

8

-

10

10

3

2

2

1

IAC

9

8

10

-

11

4

4

2

3

COR

7

8

10

11

-

6

4

4

6

GON

2

2

3

4

6

-

5

3

5

LAF

2

1

2

4

4

5

-

3

5

McL

1

2

2

2

4

3

3

-

3

5
3
3
6
5
0
1
L'-D
0
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.

The numbers have also been used to direct the order in which
the nine members of the Court are listed. The logic of sequencing is to
list the core members together, and the outsiders together, and "thin
out" upper right and lower left corners (which are of course simple
mirror images of each other). This means letting the ranking in both
directions from Cory J.-who earns the central position by virtue of his
swing role-be set by the frequency with which the individual judge
successfully enters coalitions with the "other" group. Among the
outsiders, Gonthier J. is the one with the highest number of pairings with
members of the "core" (seventeen) and L'Heureux-Dub6 J. has the
lowest (ten). Conversely, among the members of the "core," Iacobucci
J. is (next to Cory J.) the one with the highest number of pairings with
"outsiders" (thirteen) and Major J. and Lamer C.J. are the lowest (with
five). On this basis, the logical structure of the decision-delivering Court
is Major - Lamer - Sopinka - lacobucci - Cory - Gonthier - La Forest -

McLachlin-L'Heureux-Dub6. The sequence is intended to suggest that
adjacent justices are more likely to link than distant judges.
Table 2 just counts the number of coalitions in which each
pairing of judges occurred, without paying any attention to the relative
frequency with which each of these coalitions actually delivered the
decision for the Court. Edelman and Chen are adamant about this "one
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counts as one" logic-but their point is simply to demonstrate that a
specific five-judge coalition is possible, which in turn identifies the judge
most likely to defect, and this is the phenomenon with which they are
concerned. If you will, they need only demonstrate that the road exists,
without distinguishing the gravel road from the super-highway. However
our focus is not complete coalitions but the two-judge pairings within
each coalition, and this is a methodology better served by measuring the
volume of traffic than by simply noting that there is a road, by counting
relative frequencies, rather than just giving a flat list. For example: La
Forest-L'Heureux-Dub6-Gonthier and Lamer-Sopinka-Major are both
successful (decision-delivering) three-judge coalitions. But the first
occurred three times as often as the second, and it seems distorting to
leave this out of the assessment of how strong the various two-judge
linkages are. Table 3, therefore, corrects the count by weighting each
intra-coalition pairing for the frequency with which the coalition
occurred.
The correction does not in any way change the basic picture,
although it does stand out all the more dramatically now that the
numbers in most of the cells are so much larger. Several basic
impressions emerge.
TABLE 3
Two Judge Pairings Within Successful Coalitions
(Weighted for Coalition Frequency)
MAJ

LAM

SOP

IAC

COR

GON

LAF

McL

L'-D

MAJ

-

31

40

34

31

8

6

5

0

LAM

31

-

37

28

38

9

3

8

0

SOP

40

37

-

44

44

12

6

8

4

IAC

34

28

44

-

52

17

14

8

15

COR

31

38

44

52

-

25

15

16

19

GON

8

9

12

17

25

-

27

12

27

LA F

6

3

6

14

15

27

-

12

26

McL

5

8

8

8

16

12

12

-

13

L'-D
0
0
4
15
19
27
26
13
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.
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The first is the strength of the "core" coalition, reflected by the
upper left quadrant-not a single cell outside this block is as large as the
smallest number within the block (although Lamer-lacobucci may leave
just the faintest impression of a crack in the wall). The core of this
alliance, and the strongest such linking on the entire table, is CoryIacobucci. The second is the fainter but still significant impression of
the "outsider" coalition in the lower right quadrant. However, the lower
numbers for McLachlin J. seriously qualify this picture, leaving the La
Forest-Gonthier-L'Heureux-Dub6 grouping as a frustratingly small
counterbalance to the domination by the "core"-indeed, on this count,
Cory J. appears to be a better member of the "outsiders" than
McLachlin J. The third is the faint hint of a central block of IacobucciMajor-Gonthier-La Forest, a combination that actually occurred twice
over the seven year period (that is to say: not quite frequently enough to
make it into Table 1). The fourth is the relative isolation of the two
female members of the Court, McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ., who
are involved in fewer decisionmaking combinations and fewer successful
two-judge linkages than any of their male counterparts-without, on the
other hand, suggesting any tendency toward forming a solid linkage
between themselves, either. The fifth is the central role of Cory J., who
comes closer than anyone else to being everybody's favourite partner in
a coalition-core and outsiders alike. This just confirms the idea,
already suggested in the concept of the "alternative core," that Cory J. is
a central player in the decisionmaking dynamics of the Lamer Court.
B. Voting Behaviour
Tables 2 and 3, however informative, are really answering the
question "how often do A and B sign on together for the majority"which is to say that they are looking at only the tip of a slightly larger
iceberg. Below that particular surface is the bigger question of how
often A and B sign on together for any purpose, whether decision,
concurrence, or dissent. This narrowing of the question is mildly
distorting for an understanding of all the members of the Court-since
everyone is with the minority at least one-fifth of the time-but it is
particularly distorting for an understanding of those members, such as
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., who find themselves in the majority the least often.
The way to escape this distortion is to look at all participation in divided
courts, whether or not it results in a judge signing on to the decision of
the Court. And this involves a series of computations for each of the
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members of the Court, which are illustrated in Table 4 with respect only
to Lamer C.J.
TABLE 4
Lamer's Interactions With Other Judges
Together
Followed Joined

Apart
Differed Parallel

Other

Judge

Unan.

Led

GON

200

38

4

53

60

1

52

SOP

195

61

34

48

34

6

32

L'-D

190

7

4

25

98

0

80

McL

188

26

15

35

67

8

56

LA F

186

33

8

57

56

6

58

COR

185

59

27

53

38

5

32

IAC

184

41

19

53

35

6

31

3
24
52
32
124
29
11
MAJ
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.
Lamer C.J. sat with La Forest J. on a total of 404 panels, 218 of
which resulted in divided decisions. Ninety-eight times, they signed on
to the same set of outcome-plus-reasons, with Lamer C.J. writing thirtythree times, La Forest J. eight, and some other member of a coalition
writing fifty-seven times!' Fifty-six times they "differed," which is to say
that one (but not both) dissented from the decision of the Court. Six
times they wrote parallel opinions, which means either that both wrote
their own dissents or that both wrote their own separate concurrences.
And fifty-eight times, one of them was in the decision-writing coalition
and the other was writing or signing a separate concurrence. Similar sets
of numbers can be generated for the other thirty-five pairings.
The three numbers in the "together" column measure the
frequency with which any pair of judges agreed to the extent of signing
the same set of reasons for judgment-this is the broader measure of
which Table 3 gives a limited summary by considering only the times that
40 This total would also include times that Lamer C.J. and La Forest J. joined in a common
dissent or separate concurrence, although these numbers are very low across the entire Court-in

seven years only about 100 separate concurrences and 150 dissents drew one or more additional
signatures.
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this agreement forms behind the majority/plurality decision of the Court.
These new numbers allow us to generate the matrix anew, working now
from all divided panel service for each pairing of judges and not just
from those times when that particular pairing is part of the successful
coalition. The results are shown in Table 5, the numbers indicating the
number of times that any pair of judges joined each other as a
percentage of their total appearances together on a divided panel.
Again, the bottom left half of the table (below the blank cells) is simply a
mirror of the upper right half.
TABLE 5
Explicit Agreement Frequency

MAJ

SOP

LAM

IAC

COR GON

LA F McL

L'-D

MAJ

-

69%

61%

64%

63%

44%

43%

40%

18%

SOP

69%

-

67%

67%

61%

45%

45%

35%

20%

LAM

61%

67%

-

61%

65%

46%

47%

37%

17%

IAC

64%

67%

61%

-

74%

56%

55%

40%

28%

COR

63%

61%

65%

74%

-

59%

53%

39%

31%

GON

44%

45%

46%

56%

59%

-

64%

45%

51%

LAF

43%

45%

47%

55%

53%

64%

-

44%

44%

McL

40%

35%

37%

40%

39%

45%

44%

-

38%

L'-D 18%
20% 17% 28% 31% 51% 44% 38%
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.

-

It might be argued that limiting the notion of agreement to
include only those times when the two judges sign on together-that is to
say, omitting the times when one or both are writing their own separate
concurrences, or when they are both writing their own separate dissents
to an outcome that both reject-unrealistically narrows the category,
since these situations still mean that they both support the same result if
not the same reasons. Table 6 builds on this broader notion, although it
does so from the other side-it now measures only explicit and complete
disagreement, drawn from the "differed" column in Table 4. That is to
say, it measures the number of times that one of the judges dissented
and the other did not, expressed as a percentage of the total number of
times that both were members of a panel that delivered a divided
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decision. Table 5 measures complete agreement; Table 6 measures
complete disagreement; and what remains are a set of circumstancesboth judges writing or signing different dissents, or one or both judges
signing separate concurrences-that are somewhat harder to classify.
Again, the lower left of the table, below the diagonal row of blank cells,
mirrors the upper right; but on this table, it is the low numbers that
signal a potential coalition.
TABLE 6
Explicit Disagreement Frequency
MAJ

SOP

LAM

IAC

COR

GON

LAF

MCL

L'-D

MAJ

-

15%

21%

23%

23%

31%

33%

38%

49%

SOP

15%

-

16%

18%

20%

32%

31%

36%

47%

LAM

21%

16%

-

19%

18%

29%

27%

32%

46%

IAC

23%

18%

19%

-

16%

22%

21%

35%

38%

COR

23%

20%

18%

16%

-

23%

23%

31%

34%

GON

31%

32%

29%

22%

23%

-

16%

27%

24%

LA F

33%

31%

27%

21%

23%

16%

-

26%

30%

MCL

38%

36%

32%

35%

31%

27%

26%

-

27%

L'-D 49% 47% 46% 38% 34% 24% 30% 27%
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.

-

As it happens, the two tables yield highly similar results for our
purposes; there are no overt and systematic differences in the way that
explicit disagreement relates to explicit agreement for any pairings of
judges.41 And the patterns in both these tables largely agree with those
from Table 2 and Table 3. The one minor difference is that Lamer C.J.
and Sopinka J. trade places, Lamer J. moving one slot closer to Cory J.
in the centre and Sopinka J. shifting one place closer to Major J. at the
outside edge of the "core" group. The new logical structure of the Court
41 This is not, of course, to say that there are no such differences-just that they do not
accumulate in a way that affects the demonstrated patterns. Generally, explicit disagreement
accounts for 53 per cent of the cases that do not result in explicit agreement, but for the various
two-judge pairings this varies from a low of 43 per cent (McLachlin-L'Heureux-Dub6) to a high of
64 per cent (all three wings of the Lamer-lacobucci-Major connection).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 36 No. 2

is Major - Sopinka - Lamer - lacobucci - Cory - Gonthier - La Forest -

McLachlin-L'Heureux-Dub6.
But all the other elements of the earlier tables are strongly
confirmed. The core group is clearly marked by the fact that all ten of
the intra-core linkages show a rate of agreement of more than 60 per
cent and a rate of disagreement of less than 25 per cent. The outsiders
are also characterized by higher-than-average agreement rates and
lower-than-average disagreement rates-but not to the same extent as
the core. Cory J. still holds the centre of the Court, a solid member of
the core who is at the same time more ready than most to agree with the
outsiders as well, but this is not so pronounced as it appeared in the
simpler coalition-driven version. Again, the strongest two-judge linkage
is that between Cory and lacobucci JJ., who sign on together in almost
three-quarters of their appearances and explicitly disagree in less than
one-sixth, although the Gonthier-La Forest pairing is also strong. Once
again, these four at the centre show agreement rates that point toward a
"shadow centre" group.
And it is also still the case that the two women judges appear to
be isolated at one edge of the Court-L'Heureux-Dub6 J. alone
accounts for the five lowest two-judge scores, McLachlin J. for the next
six lowest. Since one of these eleven scores is the one that links the two
women judges themselves, neither can it reasonably be suggested that
they constitute the potential core of a new group. The persistence of this
pattern through several levels of analysis is significant. One of the issues
that was debated when women members of the profession began to
receive their share of positions on the higher courts was whether women
judges would, in the words of one article title,42 "make a difference."
Would female judges bring different values and different priorities to the
bench, or would their behaviour reflect the same strong imprint of class
and professional training as male judges? Some early studies of
provincial courts of appeal suggested that the latter was the case-that
there was no systematic difference in the general patterns of outcomes
between male and female judges, even on such gender-sensitive issues as
sexual assault.43 But the patterns of Table 6 (and the earlier tables)
point the opposite direction-this is exactly what one would expect to
find if there were gender-linked differences in judicial performance, if
there were things about the law that female judges were more likely to
42 The Hon. B. Wilson, "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" (1990) 28 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 507.
43 P. McCormick & T. Job, "Do Women Judges Make a Difference?" (1993) 8 Can. J. L. &
Soc'y 135.
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identify and to highlight than male judges. This impression is reinforced
by the fact that the two female judges can be so different from each
other even while both differ significantly from their male colleagues. It
is not my purpose at this time to tease out what those differences might
be, but simply to acknowledge a strong statistical indication that such
differences may well exist.
The material in Table 5 can be read a different way, as
suggesting not only the absolute levels of agreement between any pair of
judges (the percentage of the time they join on a judgment, or negatively
in Table 6 the percentage of the time they directly disagree), but also the
relative levels of agreement between each judge and his/her colleagues.
For each judge, we can identify their "favourite" coalition partner, which
is to say the judge with whom they directly agree the most often; and
then their second favourite partner, and so on. This information is
collected in Table 7. Note that the rankings in the table should be read
down, not across-for example, Major J. is Iacobucci J.'s third most
frequent partner, Sopinka J. his second, and so on. Note also that unlike
the previous tables of similar appearance, this one is not mirrored; by
definition, Cory J. agrees with Gonthier J. exactly as often as Gonthier J.
agrees with Cory J., but this agreement rate-59 per cent-makes Cory
J. Gonthier J.'s second favourite partner, but Gonthier J. only Cory J.'s
fifth favourite.
TABLE 7
Agreement Frequency Rankings
MAJ

SOP

LAM

IAC

COR

GON

LA F MCL

MAJ

-

1st

4th

3rd

3rd

8th

8th

3rd

8th

SOP

1st

-

1st

2nd

4th

7th

5th

8th

6th

LAM

4th

3rd

-

4th

2nd

5th

4th

7th

7th

IAC

2nd

2nd

2nd

-

1st

3rd

2nd

4th

5th

COR

3rd

4th

3rd

1st

-

2nd

3rd

5th

4th

GON

5th

6th

6th

5th

5th

-

1st

1st

1st

LA F

6th

5th

5th

6th

6th

1st

-

2nd

2nd

MCL

7th

7th

7th

7th

7th

6th

6th

-

3rd

L'-D
8th
8th
8th
8th
8th
4th
7th
6th
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.

L'-D

-
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This presentation of the data emphasizes the strength of the
Lamer-Sopinka-Cory-Iacobucci-Major "core" coalition, and the reason
they stand out so prominently in the decisions of divided panels. Every
one of these five has a list of preferred coalition partners topped by the
four others-indeed, this could almost serve as the definition of a
coherent and persistent coalition.4 By the same token, Table 7 shows
the weakness of the four outsiders-not only are they one judge short of
the five it would take to ensure success on full-court divided panels, but
they do not all reciprocate in putting each other at the top of their
preferred partners list. Gonthier and La Forest JJ. are first and/or
second for the other members of the group, but only L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
follows through by putting her third choice within the coalition as well.
La Forest and Gonthier JJ. give their second and third choices-not in
the same order-to Iacobucci and Cory JJ., while McLachlin J.'s third
highest level of agreement is with Major J. Putting it somewhat
melodramatically: McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. seem to be
reaching toward a coalition with Gonthier and La Forest JJ., but they in
turn are reaching for a coalition with Cory and Iacobucci JJ., even
though the latter two are firmly within the five-member core group. This
in turn strongly qualifies the appearance of a shadowy "central group" of
Cory, lacobucci, Gonthier and La Forest JJ., which seems to have a
higher relative priority for the latter two than for the first two of the
four.
Table 7 also implies that every judge has a preferred five-judge
coalition and, for that matter, a preferred four-judge coalition should
they find themselves on a divided panel, and this information is pulled
together in Table 8. Examples of cases in which this four- or five-judge
combination actually delivered a decision for the Court are given in the
endnotes. This suggestion of "preferred coalitions" is not meant lightly.
It is a serious statement of the calculations that I presume all judges
would have to be making in such a situation, as soon as it becomes clear
that their own feeling for the issues involved, and the optimal resolution
of these issues, are not shared unanimously around the table. Surely the
first step would be to identify those members of the panel with whom
they were most frequently in agreement, especially on similar issues, and
to try to work out some common ground with them, whether this
persuasive effort takes place over the post-hearing conference table, in
the drafting and editing of reasons for judgment, or in personal
conversation in chambers or over coffee. These ongoing attempts at
44 They also show a striking consistency in the ranking order for the four other members of
the Court-Gonthier or La Forest JJ. at the top, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. at the bottom.
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mutual persuasion are neither illegitimate nor marginal to the appellate
process; appellate decisionmaking is not a flat "listen, vote and leave"
but a collegial process organized around a rational core resulting in a
discursive product.' Without ongoing, persuasive give-and-take, the
process and the product are both compromised.
TABLE 8
Preferred Five- and Four-Judge Coalitions
(Based on Actual Agreement Rates)

Judge

PreferredFive-Judge Coalition

LAM

Lam Sop Cor Iac Maj

LA F

Lam La F Cor Gon ac

L-D

La F L'-D Cor Gon McL

SOP

Lam Sop Cor Iac Maj

COR

Lam Sop Cor Iac Maj

GON

La For L'-D Cor Gon Iac

McL

La F Gon Maj lac Cor

IAC

Lam Sop Cor lac Maj

1

2

Lam Sop Cor Iac
4
La F Cor Gon Iac

3

5

7

La F L'-D Gon McL6
Lam Sop lac Maj

9

Lam Cor Iac Maj
11

13

15

PreferredFour-JudgeCoalition

8
10

12

La F Cor Gon Iac
La F Gon McL Maj 14
Sop Cor Iac Maj

16

17
Sop Cor Iac Maj 18
Lam Sop Cor Iac Maj
MAJ
*Divided panels. Reported Supreme Court of Canada decisions 1990-97.

The more extensive the areas of persisting agreement, and the
more constant the past cooperation between any pair of judges, the
easier and more natural the give-and-take of persuasion must be. The
bulk of the attention must surely go to the outer edge of the putative
coalition, the one whose signature will most likely tilt the balance and
decide who will write the majority decision and who will write the
dissent. And again it is important to remember that the reasons for
judgment are at least as large a part of the Supreme Court's role as
getting the decision right in the first place-it is the reasons for

45 See, for example, L.A. Kornhauser & L.G. Sager "Unpacking the Court" (1986-87) 96 Yale
L.J. 82.
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judgment that will tell lower courts and other actors what the law is,
what principles have to be applied, and how the established rules have to
be adjusted, or newly understood, in order to confront changing
circumstances. In the fine tuning of such a text, there is a great deal of
room for give and take, for persuasion and concession, for finessing
differences rather than letting them stand or fall on "all or nothing"
confrontations.
Cory J.'s central position is clear; he is the only member of the
Court who is on every single one of his colleagues' preferred five-judge
coalitions, and also on five of the eight four-judge coalitions. Iacobucci
J. enjoys a similar position, being on seven of his eight colleagues' fivejudge coalitions-one less than Cory J.-as well as six of his colleagues'
four-judge coalitions-one more than Cory J. At the other extreme,
McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. are on one preferred five-judge
coalition each, and one preferred four-judge coalition between them.
This is not, it must be stressed, a question of popularity; what is
at stake here is not the Mr. or Ms. Congeniality award, nor the question
of whom one would most like to be stuck in an elevator with. To be
sure, in any organization with a small number of members and little
turnover, it is only to be expected that personality issues will intrude
from time to time. However, the phenomenon that has been explored
here is primarily a question of congruent perceptions of issues and
principles and priorities. Judges sign on together on a set of reasons, not
because they may or may not like each other, but because they agree that
it is the optimal set of reasons for this particular case at this particular
time. The wording itself may have emerged from a process of bargaining
and concession and compromise, and the agreement of some of the
members may be tactical rather than permanent, but, for all that, it is a
genuine statement of principled agreement. Judges who frequently
agree are revealing, not personal friendships, but overlapping and
congruent perceptions of the legal issues, and as that circle of agreement
reaches to include a majority of the Court, it sets the tone for the Court's
jurisprudence.
To all the foregoing, one massive qualification must be
registered: I have treated the entire block of divided panel decisions by
the Supreme Court of Canada as a single coherent database, and I have
discussed levels of agreement and disagreement as if they were grouped
along a single dimension, as if the one-dimensional single ranking at the
top of the matrices could adequately capture these relationships. In fact,
there must be several dimensions, and this discussion of aggregate
figures is undoubtedly blurring several different components into a
single composite picture that does not perfectly reflect any of them.
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Major and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. have the lowest rate of explicit
agreement of any pairing on the Court, signing on together in barely
one-sixth of their joint appearances, and the matrix reflects this fact by
putting them at opposite ends of the Court. But the critical thing to
remember is that as often as one-sixth of the time, Major and
L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. agree with each other even at times when they are
both disagreeing with other colleagues on the Court with whom they
normally agree. This means that there are issues or general areas of the
law or types of appeal on which Major and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ. can only
accurately be charted on a decision-making matrix as being located at
something other than the remote extreme ends. By the same token, of
course, there must be other areas in which their agreement rates are
even lower.
By treating all types of cases the same, I am also implicitly
treating all seven years the same. This may also be somewhat unrealistic.
At the beginning of the 1990 fall term, many of the members of the
Lamer Court were extremely junior-indeed, the average years of
experience for the Supreme Court of Canada was lower in 1991-with
the departure of Wilson J.-than it had been at any time since
Fitzpatrick C.J.'s chief justiceship in 1906. At the end of the 1996 fall
term, all of them were relative veterans with at least five years
experience on the country's highest court. It is only to be expected that
there will have been some transitional effect involved 46 -even for those
with appellate court experience (a group which includes all but Sopinka
J.), the shift to "playing without a backstop" on the Supreme Court can
be challenging. It may be that some alliances-that is, inter-judge
agreement rates-have strengthened and others have weakened through
that process. On the other hand, it is unlikely that this settling-in
process involves any major change in direction; judges even more than
most professionals value consistency and continuity, and their earlier
lower court decisions constitute a written record of value commitments
that they will not lightly repudiate." Therefore, of the two implicit
assumptions in this methodology, "all areas" is of more real concern
than "all years."

46 See, for example, R. Carp & R. Wheeler, "Sink or Swim: Socialization of a Federal District
Judge" (1992) 21 J. Pub. L. 359; L. Alpert, B.M. Atkins & R.C. Ziller, "Becoming a Judge: The

Transition from Advocate to Arbiter" (1979) 62 Judicature 325; and S. Goldberg, "Judicial
Socialization: An Empirical Study" (1985) 11 J. Contemp. L 423.
47

See, for example, R.C. Lawlor, "Personal Stare Decisis" (1967-68) 41 S. Cal. L Rev. 73.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This statistical examination of seven years of divided panel
decisions by the Lamer Court is based on four assumptions that should
be made absolutely explicit.
First, I am assuming that the primary focus of a final court of
appeal is less the resolution of immediate cases than the provision of
judicial leadership for the lower courts through the articulation and
elaboration and refinement of legal doctrine. This is not to suggest that
outcomes are irrelevant, or that the Supreme Court is in any way casual
about them, but simply to emphasize that the Court produces reasoned
outcomes, and that in the long run these reasons are more important
than the outcomes. The product of the Court is not just concrete lists of
"winners" and "losers" but more significantly the development of a
discursive body of jurisprudence.
Second, I am assuming that the appellate process is best thought
of as a collegial process, one that legitimately involves persuasive
argumentation, compromise, and even negotiation ("change the wording
on such-and-such and I will sign on") between the judges who sit on any
panel. This conversational mode itself presumes that judges are most
likely to be sympathetic to a particular argument or value or issue, and,
therefore, the most promising parties for persuasion; these tactical
considerations are likewise a legitimate concern for the judges, and,
therefore, for court watchers as well.
Third, given that unanimity is not always possible, then
majorities or even pluralities of judges must often prevail. If we are to
understand the operations of the Court at such times, the search must be
for those coalitions of judges who prevail on a persisting basis; and since
the Supreme Court of Canada works with panels of varying sizes, this
cannot be limited to five-judge coalitions. Another way of thinking
about these coalitions, which are complex and dynamic rather than static
and polarized, is in terms of the varying frequency of agreement between
different pairs of judges on the Court, thus meshing with the persuasion
argument above.
Fourth, the judicial value of transparent and principled
consistency validates the search for continuity in the form of persisting
levels of agreement between two or more judges. This is a rational
process organized around values and principles, not a question of
personal popularity, although conceivably personality factors could
mildly reinforce or erode the patterns. By examining two-judge levels of
persisting agreement, we are not reducing judging to a mechanical
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process or treating the judges' actions as based on pre-rational
orientations but, quite the reverse, we are taking them at their word as
rational articulators of principled positions.
The findings of this study should not be thought of in terms as
simple as "Lamer C.J. and Sopinka and Cory and Iacobucci and Major
JJ. always vote together, so they always win." In part, this is because
they do not always vote together, and therefore they do not always
"win." The ten two-judge pairings contained within that five-judge
coalition do tend to show higher levels of agreement than all but one of
the other two-judge combinations on the Court, but there is nothing
mechanical about this process and the (smaller number of) departures
from agreement are as legitimate and as important as the (larger
number of) agreements. The importance of these findings is not to treat
the two-judge pairings or the five-judge coalition as if they were some
kind of natural phenomenon, but rather to use them to find the values
and principles and areas of law around which the agreement clusters-as
well as the values and principles and areas of law about which frequently
agreeing judges no longer agree. In that sense, this article is less a
finished product than a simple prolegomena to a deeper understanding
of the coalitions and inter-judge agreements at the core of the Lamer
Court.
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